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I Comments I
Lethal But Not Disabled?-The
Circuits Split on ADA Coverage of the
Asymptomatic HIV-Positive Victim
I. Introduction
The first public report of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV") and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS")
appeared on June 5, 1981, in a report by the Center for Disease
Control As explained by Dr. C. Everett Koop, former Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service, HIV infection is the
underlying cause of AIDS, a disease that attacks the body with flu-
like symptoms, causes detectable abnormalities of the immune
system, and may result in physical impairments without visible signs
of illness. 2 HIV also affects the brain and central nervous system
and may cause, among other things, memory loss, loss of coordina-
tion, paralysis, and dementia.'
Following the 1981 report, people associated HIV and AIDS
with generally deviant behavior, homosexuality, and death; they
1. See Pneumocystis Pneumonia - Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs.), June 5, 1981, No. 21, at 251.
2. See Memorandum from Douglas Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to
Arthur B. Culvahouse Jr., Counsel to the President, Justice Department Memorandum on the
Application of Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Persons, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 195, at 5 (Oct. 7, 1988) [hereinafter Kmiec Memorandum].
3. See id. at 5 n.9.
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referred to AIDS as the "gay plague."4 Panic spread throughout
society and led to the exclusion of HIV-infected individuals from
such areas as the workplace and schools.5 Health officials viewed
this mass hysteria and resulting discrimination as an obstruction to
rational public health strategies.6 They denounced it as negative
stereotyping that would discourage the general public from seeking
testing and counseling about HIV and AIDS and thus endanger the
health of the entire American population.7
Over forty-three million Americans currently suffer from
disabilities.8 Despite this considerable and ever-increasing number,
society too often views those with disabilities, including those with
HIV infection, as dangerous and deviant social outcasts.9 They
"remind[] us of our corporeal limitations, our inability to control
our fate, and ultimately, our mortality."'" In 1990, in response to
impermissible segregation and isolation of individuals with
disabilities,"t Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
(the "ADA").12 It intended to invoke the full sweep of congres-
sional power to eliminate disability-based discrimination. 3 The
ADA forbids discrimination against individuals with disabilities by
all entities covered by the ADA. 4
Under the ADA, "The term 'disability' means, with respect to
an individual (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B)
a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
4. See Daniel J. Jackson & Wendy E. Parmet, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact
of the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9 (1997).
5. See id. at 10.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 10-11.
8. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990).
9. See Jackson & Parmet, supra note 4, at 11.
10. Id. at 12.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. The ADA forbids discrimination against employees
with disabilities by employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-
management committees. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). It forbids public entities, including state
or local governments and commuter authorities, to discriminate against or deny benefits to
individuals with disabilities. See id. §§ 12115(1), 12132. The ADA also forbids discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities by those who own, lease, or operate places of
public accommodation, see id. § 12182(a), and by private entities that provide public
transportation services. See id. § 12184(a).
[Vol. 103:1
LETHAL BUT NOT DISABLED?
such an impairment. 1 5 A recent split in the federal circuits has
raised the question of whether an asymptomatic HIV-infected
person qualifies as an individual with a disability under the
ADA.16 The cases illustrate the inherent tension in the AIDS
debate and perhaps reflect a divergence between political and
social viewpoints and established law.
This Comment explores the recent debate over whether the
ADA protects asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals from
discrimination. First, Section II provides an overview of the history
of ADA coverage of HIV infection. It focuses on relevant
legislative history, administrative regulations, and case law. Section
III presents a detailed look at the split in the federal circuits over
ADA coverage of asymptomatic HIV infection. It traces two
significant cases, outlining their factual and procedural backgrounds
as well as the reasoning behind the First and Fourth Circuits'
conflicting resolutions of the same problem. Section IV argues that
both the law and public necessity demand ADA protection for
asymptomatic HIV-positive victims. It concentrates on the ADA's
definition of "disability," and suggests that the Fourth Circuit's
denial of ADA coverage is inconsistent with legislative history,
administrative regulations, and established case law. Section V
addresses the Supreme Court's recent holding that the ADA does
protect an asymptomatic HIV-positive plaintiff.'7 Finally, this
Comment concludes that asymptomatic HIV-positive persons
qualify as individuals with disabilities under the ADA. Section VI
examines the Fourth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the ADA,
notes certain inconsistencies in and potential consequences of its
logic, and recommends resolution of the federal conflict in favor of
broad ADA coverage.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
16. Compare Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that an
asymptomatic HIV-infected person qualifies as an individual with a disability under the
ADA), with Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that
an asymptomatic HIV-infected person does not qualify as an individual with a disability
under the ADA).
17. The author wrote this Comment before the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear the First Circuit case. Because of printing deadlines, discussion of the Supreme Court
decision occurs at the end of the Comment, rather than throughout its text.
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II. Background: The Evolution of ADA Coverage of Asymp-
tomatic HIV Infection
Congress enacted the ADA with the intent to provide legal
recourse to those suffering from disabling conditions and who have
been intentionally "relegated to a position of political powerless-
ness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assump-
tions not truly indicative of the ... ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society."' 8 Congress defined the
term "disability" broadly and failed to specify what conditions the
term encompasses. 19 Despite its use of liberal language, however,
Congress simplified application of the ADA by requiring both the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to issue regulations interpret-
ing and implementing the ADA's scope and mandates.2 ° Congres-
sional support for agency regulations is evident in the ADA's
legislative history.2' Legislative history,2 administrative regula-
tions," and settled precedent24 all indicate that asymptomaticHIV infection constitutes a disability under the ADA.
A. Congress Intended ADA Protection for Asymptomatic HIV-
Infected Individuals
When Congress passed the ADA in 1990, it intended for the
ADA to cover asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals.25 Congress
expressly stated that persons with HIV, whether symptomatic or
not, "have an impairment that substantially limits a major life
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7).
19. See id. § 12102(2). "The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual (A)
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment." Id.
20. See id. §§ 12116, 12117,12134(a); see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena
L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "Congress unquestionably delegated to the
Department [of Justice] the authority to flesh out the statutory framework by issuance of its
regulations." Id.
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990); S. REP. No.
101-116, at 22 (1990).
22. See infra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 60-93 and accompanying text.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485 at 28 n.18, 51-52; S. REP. No. 101-116 at 22.
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activity."" It purposefully omitted a list of disabilities from the
ADA for fear of excluding disorders that may develop in the
future, but contemplated ADA protection for HIV-infected persons
because of substantial limitations to both procreation and intimate
sexual relations.27 Even the ADA's opponents agree that asymp-
tomatic HIV infection constitutes a disability under the ADA.28
Furthermore, while the ADA expressly excludes numerous
behaviors and conditions from coverage, it does not exclude HIV
infection.29 Congress created specific exclusions in order to avoid
protecting individuals from discrimination on the basis of socially
unacceptable, immoral, or illegal behavior.3" For instance, the
ADA denies coverage to kleptomania,31 pyromania,32 exhibition-
ism,33 and illicit drug use. Had Congress viewed HIV infection
as unacceptable or immoral, or intended its exclusion from ADA
coverage, Congress would have listed it among those ailments to
which it expressly denied disability status. Congress recognized,
however, that HIV is a deadly condition affecting the hemic35 and
26. H.R. REP. No. 101-485 at 28 n.18.
27. See id. at 51-52; S. REP. No. 101-116 at 22.
28. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10,765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Helms).
29. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1990)
(excluding from coverage homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments,
sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive
substance use disorders resulting from current illegal drug use).
30. See 135 CONG. REC. S10,796 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Rudman).
[W]e are talking about behavior that is immoral, improper, or illegal and which
individuals are engaging in of their own volition, admittedly for reasons we do not
fully understand. Where we as a people have through a variety of means, includ-
ing our legal code, expressed disapproval of certain conduct, I do not understand
how Congress can create the possibility that employers are legally liable for taking
such conduct into account when making employment-related decisions.
Id.
31. See 42 U.S.C. §12211(b)(2). Kleptomania is defined as the "[o]bsessive desire to
steal, esp[ecially] in the absence of economic necessity." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE
UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 677 (1984).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(2). Pyromania is defined as "[an irresistible urge to start
fires." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 959 (1984).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1). Exhibitionism is defined as the "[clompulsive exposure
of the sexual organs in public." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY
452 (1984).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(3).
35. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5. Hemic is defined as "[o]f, relating to,




lymphatic" systems. Although an asymptomatic individual may
appear outwardly healthy, that individual is seriously ill, similar to
an individual with a disease like cancer.37
Congress intended to protect both symptomatic and asymptom-
atic HIV-infected persons from discrimination.38  Expressing
agreement with a DOJ memorandum written by the former
assistant attorney general, and consistent with DOJ regulations,
Congress stated, "as noted by the U.S. Department of Justice,... a
person infected with HIV is covered under the first prong of the
definition of the term 'disability' because of a substantial limitation
to procreation and intimate sexual relationships."39 When Con-
gress enacts a statute voicing approval of administrative regulations,
it essentially adopts those regulations and renders them binding
authority.40
Congressional resolve to protect asymptomatic HIV-infected
persons is evidenced not only by documented legislative history and
by the deliberate exclusion of HIV from an enumerated list of non-
disabilities, but by the ADA itself.41 The ADA states that
"nothing in this Act shall be construed to apply a lesser standard
than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. ",42 The Rehabilitation Act's definition of an individual
with a handicap is substantially the same as the ADA's definition
of an individual with a disability.43 Additionally, courts have
declared that the Rehabilitation Act protects asymptomatic victims
36. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5. The lymphatic system is "[t]he
interconnected system of spaces and vessels between tissues and organs by which lymph is
circulated throughout the body," and lymph is "[a] clear, transparent, watery, occas[ionally]
faintly yellowish liquid that contains white blood cells and some red blood cells,... and acts
to remove bacteria and certain proteins from the tissues, transport fat from the intestines,
and supply lymphocytes to the blood." WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY
DICTIONARY 710 (1984).
37. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5.
38. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
39. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990).
40. See United States v. Board of Comm'rs., 435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978).
41. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1990).
42. Id.
43. See The Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(b)(1973). An individual with
a handicap is "any person who (I) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2) (defining "disability" under the ADA).
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of HIV.44 Hence, it is evident that Congress drafted the ADA
intending to protect asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals against
undue discrimination.
B. Administrative Regulations Define Asymptomatic HIV
Infection as a Disability Under the ADA
In addition to legislative history and statutory text, administra-
tive regulations define asymptomatic HIV infection as a disability
under the ADA.45 The ADA empowers both the DOJ and the
EEOC to promulgate regulations implementing the ADA.46
While such regulations are not' binding authority, courts must
accord them significant deference in applying ADA provisions.47
Agency regulations recognize that asymptomatic HIV infection
is an impairment under the ADA's definition of disability.48 A
physical or mental impairment is "any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one
or more of the following body systems: ... reproductive,... hemic
and lymphatic," and "includes, but is not limited to, such conta-
gious and noncontagious diseases and conditions as ... HIV
44. See, e.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Baxter v.
City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill. 1989); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp.
376 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Department of State,
662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987); Martinez v. School Bd., 675 F. Supp. 1574 (M.D. Fla. 1987);
Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 649 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Raytheon Co. v.
California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 507 A.2d 253 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986), affld, 523 A.2d
655 (N.J. 1987); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1986).
45. See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12117, 12134(a).
47. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
863-64 (1984) (emphasizing that courts must defer to agency regulations implementing
ambiguous legislation); see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579,
585 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (relying on DOJ regulations to apply the ADA, and noting that agency
regulations are due significant deference because of their legal and policymaking authority);
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 1995) (affording
broad deference to agency regulations in interpreting the ADA); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty,
Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 781 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding agency regulations to be significantly
persuasive). See generally Ferguson v. Phoenix, 931 F. Supp. 688 (D. Ariz. 1996) (deferring
to agency technical assistance manuals in interpreting the ADA with respect to its
requirements for making 911 emergency systems accessible to hearing impaired persons);
Pinnock v. Int'l House of Pancakes, 844 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993), cert denied, 512 U.S.
1228 (1994) (relying on administrative regulations and technical assistance manuals in
rejecting a constitutional challenge to the ADA).
48. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)(h)-(j) (1995); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1994).
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disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic)."49 The regula-
tions also acknowledge that reproduction is a major life activity
within the ADA's contemplation.5 ° While they list only such
major life activities as caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
working, sitting, standing, lifting, and reading,51 they use the words
"such as," indicating that the enumeration of activities is not
exclusive and is broad enough to include reproduction.52 More-
over, the ADA uses the term "major life activity" as defined by the
regulations implementing the 'Rehabilitation Act of 1973,"3 and
precedent establishes that reproduction is a major life activity
within the purview of that Act.5 4
Administrative regulations explain that an impairment will
substantially limit a major life activity when it renders an individual
less able to perform the activity, or when it significantly restricts an
individual in the condition, manner, or duration under which that
individual can perform the activity as compared to the average
person in the general population.55  In determining whether
individuals are substantially limited in their ability to perform a
major life activity, a court should ignore the availability and effects
of medications or other mitigating measures.5 6  A court should
focus on the nature and severity of an impairment, how long the
impairment will last or is expected to last, and the impairment's
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)(h)-(j); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
50. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
51. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)(i); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104; U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, at 11-3, (1992) [hereinafter EEOC TA Manual].
52. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940 (1st Cir. 1997).
53. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)(i).
54. See, e.g., Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding
that Doe's HIV-positive status is a physical impairment that substantially limits the major
life activities of "procreation, sexual contact, and normal social relationships"); Doe v.
Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting that an
asymptomatic HIV-positive child "may not engage in reproductive functions without
endangering the lives of others. While [he] may not yet be of an age where such activity is
appropriate, the mere prospect of such a limitation is certain to restrict social interaction with
those of the opposite sex."); see also Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp.
376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1987). "Persons infected with the AIDS virus suffer significant impair-
ments of their major life activities .... Even those who are asymptomatic have abnor-
malities ... making procreation and childbirth dangerous to themselves and others." Id.
55. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)0).
56. See EEOC TA Manual, supra note 51, at 11-4.
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permanent, long term, or expected impact.57  Regulations declare
that due to the permanently debilitating and deadly nature of HIV
infection, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, the virus is
inherently and substantially limiting.58 Asymptomatic HIV sub-
stantially limits an infected individual's ability to engage in the
major life activity of reproduction because of the significant danger
of transmitting the virus to the individual's child during pregnan-
cy.
59
C. Courts Tend to Apply the ADA to Asymptomatic HV-
Positive Individuals
Established case law indicates that asymptomatic HIV infection
constitutes a disability under the ADA. The definition of an
individual with a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is
equivalent to that of an individual with a disability under the
ADA. 60  Also, the ADA states that its provisions do not apply
lesser standards than those applied under the Rehabilitation Act.61
Thus, courts have acknowledged that case law interpreting the
meaning of "handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act applies
equally to interpretations of "disability" in ADA cases.
62
The United States Supreme Court, in School Board of Nassau
County, Florida v. Arline,63 held that contagious diseases clearly
fall within the definition of "handicap" under the Rehabilitation
Act.64 In Arline, where a school teacher with recurring tuberculo-
sis brought a suit under the Rehabilitation Act to challenge her
57. See id.
58. See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630(2)(I).
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630(2)(I).
60. See The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1973). An individual
with a handicap is "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." Id.; see also The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990). "The term 'disability'
means, with respect to an individual (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). "[N]othing in this Act shall be construed to apply a lesser
standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title." Id. (citation omitted).
62. See, e.g., Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 803 (N.D. Ill. 1996). As
the definition of disability is the same under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, case
law regarding that definition under the Rehabilitation Act applies to ADA actions. See id.
63. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
64. See id. at 277.
1998]
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dismissal, the Supreme Court explained that contagious diseases are
impairments because they cause "diminished physical or mental
capabilities" in their victims.6" A recent split in the federal
circuits has raised the question of whether asymptomatic HIV
infection also falls within the definition of "handicap" or "disabili-
ty".66 Consistent with Arline, the First Circuit has held that HIV
infection, whether symptomatic or not, is a physical impairment
under the ADA.67 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit has found that
an asymptomatic individual does not have an impairment under the
ADA due to a lack of visible suffering or illness.
68
Various courts support the First Circuit's holding, for HIV
cripples multiple bodily systems, including the hemic, lymphatic,
and reproductive systems, and impairs individuals because of -both
its biological effects and the fear it inspires in others. 69 Although
one who contracts HIV might not exhibit symptoms for a signifi-
cant period of time, if ever,7" courts do not distinguish between
those who have developed full-blown AIDS and those who have
remained asymptomatic. 71 For example, in Gates v. Rowland,"
the Ninth Circuit refused to distinguish between symptomatic and
asymptomatic HIV.73 The court explained that "it is the possible
transmission of the virus to others that is the basis of the individu-
al's disability under the provisions of the Act."74
Similarly, in Austin v. Pennsylvania Department of Correc-
tions,75 a Pennsylvania district court approved a settlement
agreement satisfying inmates' challenges to various prison practices
65. See id. at 281.
66. Compare Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that an
asymptomatic HIV-positive individual has a disability under the ADA) vacated and
remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), with Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th
Cir. 1997) (holding that an asymptomatic HIV-positive individual does not have a disability
under the ADA).
67. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 938.
68. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 169; Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. and Educ. Radio,
Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
69. See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987);
Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1465 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Cain
v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
70. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994); Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 679.
71. See, e.g., Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446; Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522-24 (11th Cir.
1991); Austin, 876 F. Supp. at 1465; Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 679.
72. 39 F.3d 1439.
73. See id. at 1446.
74. Id.
75. 876 F. Supp. 1437.
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and conditions, and noted that asymptomatic HIV infection is an
impairment both because of its physical effects on the body and
because of the fear it inspires in others. 76 The Austin decision was
consistent with prior case law, which established that HIV infection,
whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, is an impairment because
it is an incurable and fatal disease that collapses its victims'
immune systems and leads to various infections and malignan-
cies.
77
Courts have found not only that asymptomatic HIV infection
is an impairment, but that the virus substantially limits the major
life activities of procreation, sexual contact, and normal social
relations.7  In Doe v. District of Columbia,79 an applicant for a
fire-fighter position sued the District of Columbia under the
Rehabilitation Act, charging that the District's withdrawal of its
offer of employment subsequent to its learning of his HIV-positive
status violated the Act.8" The court held that the asymptomatic
applicant had a physical impairment that substantially limited the
major life activities of procreation, sexual contact, and normal
social relations.81
Similarly, in Abbott v. Bragdon,82 the First Circuit granted
relief under the ADA to an asymptomatic HIV-positive woman
whose dentist refused to fill her cavity in the routine office setting
and for the customary fee.83 The court held that "HIV-positive
status has a profound impact upon ... ability to engage in intimate
sexual activity, gestation, giving birth, childrearing, and nurturing
familial relations."'  The Abbott decision reinforced the holding
85in Harris v. Thigpen, a prior Eleventh Circuit case in which the
court found that asymptomatic HIV is a physical impairment that
substantially limits the major life activity of normal social relations
76. See id. at 1465.
77. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
78. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated and
remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522-1524 (11th Cir.
1991); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992).
79. 796 F. Supp. 559.
80. See id. at 559.
81. See id. at 568.
82. 107 F.3d 934.
83. See id. at 937.
84. Id. at 939.
85. 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
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because the public regards HIV-positive individuals as handicapped
and discriminates against them due to a fear of contagion.86
Despite some courts' view that procreation is not a major life
activity because it involves voluntary conduct that people engage
in less frequently than such activities as walking and speaking,87
the Supreme Court, in Stanley v. Illinois,8 labeled reproduction a
precious, essential, and basic civil liberty.89 In Pacourek v. Inland
Steel Company,9° an employee successfully obtained a judgment
under the ADA against her employer who had discriminated
against her on the basis of her infertility.91 The court followed the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Stanley, defined "major life activity"
in terms of quality rather than quantity, and noted that reproduc-
tion is esteemed as one of the most significant achievements in life
without which the continuation of the human race would be
doomed.92 Similarly, in Abbott, the First Circuit stressed that
asymptomatic HIV substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction because it limits its victim's ability to procreate
without significant risk to the life of his or her offspring, and
perhaps to him- or herself.93 Although a few courts have found
that asymptomatic HIV does not satisfy the criteria necessary to
obtain ADA protection, many state and federal courts have held
that the asymptomatic HIV-positive individual suffers from a
disability covered by the ADA.
86. See id. at 1522-24.
87. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 170-72 (4th Cir. 1997); Krauel
v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television,
Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995).
88. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
89. See id. at 651.
90. 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D.I1l. 1996).
91. See id. at 804.
92. See id.
93. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118
S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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III. Federal Circuits Split: Are Asymptomatic HIV-Positive
Individuals Entitled to ADA Protection?
A. Abbott v. Bragdon: ADA Protection for Asymptomatic HIV
Victims
In March of 1997, in Abbott v. Bragdon,94 the First Circuit
affirmed a lower court ruling in favor of Sidney Abbott, an
asymptomatic HIV-positive woman who claimed that her dentist
violated the ADA by refusing to treat her in his office because of
her HIV status.95 On September 16, 1994, Ms. Abbott arrived at
Dr. Randon Bragdon's office for a scheduled dentist appoint-
ment.96 Although asymptomatic at the time, she was honest on
her patient registration form and indicated her infection with the
HIV virus.97 After examining Ms. Abbott and discovering a
cavity, Dr. Bragdon informed Ms. Abbott that he would perform
the routine treatment of filling her cavity only in a hospital setting
and only if she bore the extra costs of using hospital facilities.98
After refusing Dr. Bragdon's offer, Ms. Abbott filed a discrimina-
tion complaint against him under the ADA.99
The United States District Court for the District of Maine
granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Abbott.1"0 The court
ruled that HIV infection is an impairment that substantially limits
its victim in the major life activity of reproduction and thus
constitutes a protected disability under the ADA. 10' The district
court held that Dr. Bragdon's refusal to treat Ms. Abbott in his
office, which could be done safely, violated the ADA. 102
On appeal, the First Circuit noted that a court's role in
applying the ADA "is not to set public policy, but, rather, to
discern the legislature's will."'0 3  Affirming the district court's
ruling, the First Circuit held that HIV infection, whether accompa-
94. 107 F.3d 934.
95. See id. at 937-38.
96. See id. at 937.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 937-38.






nied by symptoms or not, is a physical impairment under the
ADA."°4 The court relied on administrative regulations as well
as on the reasoning of other courts, both of which have found
asymptomatic HIV to be a disability under the ADA.10 5  As
Congress did not intend for the ADA to apply only to traditional
handicaps, the question of whether asymptomatic HIV constitutes
an impairment was not the central issue in the case, and the court
viewed an affirmative answer as sufficiently established in both
statutory and common law. °6
The Abbott court focused primarily on whether reproduction
is a major life activity. 7 It emphasized that agencies empowered
to promulgate regulations implementing the ADA must view
reproduction as a major life activity, for they would not otherwise
have included the reproductive system in the regulations as a bodily
system the debilitation of which constitutes a physical impair-
ment.10 8 The court also noted that as the ADA fails to define
"major life activity," courts should look to the terms' natural
meanings. 109 As the dictionary defines "major" as greater in
importance or rank, the First Circuit reasoned that "the touchstone
for determining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is
its significance-and reproduction, which is both the source of all
life and one of life's most important activities, easily qualifies under
that criterion."" 0
In addition to determining that reproduction is a "major life
activity" because of the natural meaning of those terms, the First
Circuit denied Dr. Bragdon's claim that reproduction cannot be a
major life activity because it is merely a lifestyle choice."' The
court stressed that nearly all human conduct has elements of
choice.112 For example, speaking is a major life activity, but
some, like monks, choose to remain silent. 3 Reproduction is a
major life activity regardless of whether an individual chooses to
104. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 939.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 939-42.
108. See id. at 940.
109. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 939 (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995);
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)).
110. Id. at 939-40.
111. See id. at 940-41.
112. See id. At 941.
113. See id.
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procreate in a given situation.114 Neither frequency nor universal-
ity is necessary for conduct to be major, and procreation's depen-
dance on the making of lifestyle choices does not render it inferior
to other conduct, all of which necessarily depends upon the exercise
of volition.1 5 Reproduction is a major life activity because of its
great importance to those who engage in it."6
In Abbott, the First Circuit also held that an asymptomatic
HIV-positive woman is substantially limited in her ability to
reproduce.117 Recognizing that individualized inquiry does not
mandate consideration of whether reproduction is of particular
importance to a given ADA plaintiff,118 the court held that HIV
in general substantially limits the major life activity of reproduc-
tion." ' The court found that "No reasonable juror could con-
clude that an 8% risk of passing an incurable, debilitating, and
inevitably fatal disease to one's child is not a substantial restriction
on reproductive activity."' 20  Furthermore, the court recognized
that if an HIV-positive individual has a healthy child, it is unlikely
that the parent will live long enough to raise the child to adult-
hood.12 The Abbott court held that HIV infection, whether
symptomatic or asymptomatic, is a physical impairment that limits
the major life activity of reproduction and constitutes a protected
disability under the ADA.
122
B. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland: Discrimination
Aginst Asymptomatic H1V Victims Does Not Violate the
ADA
In August of 1997, in Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Mary-
land,23 the Fourth Circuit issued an en banc ruling against
William Runnebaum, an asymptomatic HIV-positive individual
charging his former employer with ADA-prohibited discrimina-
1241 r un ation. Mr. Runnebaum, a homosexual who was diagnosed with
114. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 942.
118. See id. at 941-42.
119. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 949.
123. 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
124. See id. at 161.
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AIDS in 1988, worked for NationsBank for nearly two years before
the bank fired him.12 He had worked for the bank for over a
year before revealing his HIV-positive status to his supervisor.
1 26
Although Mr. Runnebaum remained asymptomatic during the
course of his employment at NationsBank, his supervisor, also a
homosexual, panicked upon learning of his HIV infection. 27
Three weeks later, another department supervisor scolded Mr.
Runnebaum for jocular behavior in staff meetings and decided that
the bank should discharge him.128 Mr. Runnebaum subsequently
inquired into whether the bank's employee health plan would
subsidize his AIDS medication, and had azidothymidine ("AZT"),
a prescription drug used to treat HIV and AIDS, delivered to him
at the bank.129  On two separate occasions, bank personnel
inadvertently opened packages containing AZT and addressed to
Mr. Runnebaum. 3 ° Four months later, the bank claimed that Mr.
Runnebaum was unable to meet reduced sales goals or to conduct
himself professionally and fired him.'3 '
After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Mr.
Runnebaum filed suit against NationsBank in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland. 32 He claimed that
the bank had fired him because of his HIV-positive status, a
condition that he contended renders him disabled under the ADA
and entitles him to federal protection against discrimination based
on his HIV status.'3 3 In 1994, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of NationsBank.'34 The court found that Mr.
Runnebaum had failed to prove that NationsBank had fired him
because of his HIV status and that the bank had proffered a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct.'35
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed not only the district
court's grant of summary judgment based on a lack of evidence of
discriminatory purpose, but also the assumption made by both
125. See id. at 161-63.
126. See id. at 161-62.
127. See id. at 162.
128. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 162.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 163.
132. See id.
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parties and by the district court that Mr. Runnebaum suffered from
an ADA-protected disability.13 6 Although there was evidence of
unsatisfactory work performance that may have hindered Mr.
Runnebaum's ability to show discrimination on the basis of HIV
status,137 the Fourth Circuit held that Mr. Runnebaum was not
entitled to ADA protection regardless of whether the bank fired
him because of his HIV-positive status.13 It held that asymptom-
atic HIV does not meet the statutory definition of disability
because it is not an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity."'
The Fourth Circuit first determined that asymptomatic HIV
infection is not an impairment.14 ° The court stated that neither
legislative history nor administrative regulations is persuasive on
the issue, and that either's acceptance of the virus as a disability is
evidenced merely in "isolated passages" and "obscure referenc-
es.' 4 The Fourth Circuit found that the term "impair" can have
only one meaning, and as Congress failed to define it, the court
relied on its dictionary definition: to make worse or to have
diminishing effects.142 The court ruled that asymptomatic HIV is
not an impairment, and reasoned that a deadly virus cannot have
diminishing effects on its victims without outwardly visible
symptoms. 143  The court refused to consider legislative histo-
ry,1"4 remarking that Committee Reports fail to distinguish
between symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV,1 45 and contemplat-
ed Mr. Runnebaum's lack of ill experience with medications.146
The Fourth Circuit next determined that procreation is
probably not a major life activity contemplated by the ADA.
147
It found that in order to qualify as a major life activity, an activity
must fall within the dictionary definition of "major. "148 The
136. See id. at 164, 165 n.4.
137. See id. at 161-64.
138. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 176.
139. See id. at 169.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 167.
142. See id. at 168.
143. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 168-69.
144. See id. at 168.
145. See id. at 169.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 170.
148. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 170.
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activity must require attention or concern, and it must be "relative-
ly more significant or important than other life activities., 149 The
court held that although procreation is one of the most fundamen-
tal of human activities, it is not major enough to qualify as a major
life activity under the ADA.15°
Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that even if procreation were
a major life activity, asymptomatic HIV infection does not
substantially limit its victim's ability to engage in procreation."'
The court determined that nothing inherent in asymptomatic HIV
prevents procreation, which is merely a matter of personal lifestyle
choice and the exercise of one's good sense.152 The court rejected
the view that HIV infection substantially limits reproduction
because of the significant risk of transmission, and held that, as a
physical matter, there is no causal nexus between HIV and
reproduction.1 53  While claiming not to create a per se rule
excluding asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals from ADA
coverage,54 the Fourth Circut pronounced that "asymptomatic
HIV does not substantially limit procreation or intimate sexual
relations for purposes of the ADA,"'155 and that "asymptomatic
HIV infection will never qualify as an impairment.,
1 56
The Runnebaum court also held that the ADA would not
protect Mr. Runnebaum based on his being regarded as having an
impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life
activities.157 It stated that, in order to afford ADA protection on
such a basis, a court must make a factual determination that the
relevant and allegedly discriminating decisionmakers actually
perceived the HIV-positive plaintiff as having such an impair-
ment. 158 The Fourth Circuit concluded that there was no evi-
dence that bank administrators perceived Mr. Runnebaum as
having an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his
major life activities, or that the bank's awareness of his HIV
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 172.
152. See id.
153. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 172.
154. See id. at 167.
155. Id. at 172.
156. Id. at 169.
157. See id. at 174.
158. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 172.
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infection motivated its decision to fire him.'59 The court held that
Mr. Runnebaum failed to satisfy the ADA's definition of an
individual with a disability, and thus affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of NationsBank. 6 °
IV. Legal Requirements and Public Necessity: The Asymp-
tomatic HIV-Positive Individual is Entitled to ADA
Protection
Both statutory mandates and societal well-being demand that
the judiciary forbid discrimination on the basis of HIV infection,
whether symptomatic or asymptomatic.' Courts should not
contemplate individual responsibility for one's own infection, but
should focus on the widespread social threat of AIDS. 16  HIV is
not a private matter, but an infectious disease and a deadly public
threat that increases as discrimination deters openness and honesty
with sexual partners as well as willingness to seek testing and to
heed health advice.163 HIV is lethal to its carrier and to those its
carrier contacts via sexual intercourse, blood transfusions, or
perinatal activity.164 HIV is not a trivial or insignificant impair-
ment undeserving of ADA protection, but, whether symptomatic
or asymptomatic, is a serious and debilitating illness affecting the
immune, nervous, and reproductive systems. 65  Failure to prohib-
it discrimination based on HIV status constitutes failure to protect
those with crippled bodily systems and increases the already
significant risk of transmitting the AIDS virus.
159. See id. at 173-74.
160. See id. at 175.
161. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990)
(defining the term "disability" under the Act); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51-
52, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 333-34, 450-51 (supporting
ADA coverage of asymptomatic HIV infection) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 101-485]; S. REP.
No. 101-116, at 22 (1990) (supporting ADA coverage of asymptomatic HIV infection); 29
C.F.R. § 1630(2)(h)-(j) (1995) (supporting ADA coverage of asymptomatic HIV infection);
28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1994) (supporting ADA coverage of asymptomatic HIV infection). See
generally Jackson & Parmet, supra note 4, at 7-20 (discussing the impact of HIV and AIDS
on society and the importance of ADA protection of the infected).
162. See generally Jackson & Parmet, supra note 4, at 10-11 (discussing the reactions of
both the President's Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and public health
officials to HIV-motivated discrimination).
163. See generally id. at 40-41 (discussing the public nature of HIV and AIDS).
164. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679-80 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
165. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5 n.9.
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The recent split in the federal circuits illustrates the tension
inherent in the AIDS debate.166  In Abbott, the First Circuit
considered legislative history and administrative regulations,
acknowledged the physical effects of HIV on the human body,
recognized the central role of reproduction in a person's life, and
emphasized the unreasonableness of denying the asymptomatic
HIV-positive individual ADA protection.167  In contrast, in
Runnebaum, the Fourth Circuit pandered to the very irrationality
that denies victims of a permanently debilitating and fatal disease
federal protection against undue discrimination. 168  The Fourth
Circuit's reasoning that a lack of outwardly visible symptoms
proves the lack of any impairment1 69 ignores the detectable
physical abnormalities of the HIV victim's immune system and the
conclusion of the former Surgeon General "that from a purely
scientific perspective, persons with HIV infection are clearly
impaired., 170  The Runnebaum court overlooked regulations that
the ADA itself authorizes, 171 and rejected the reasoning of the
numerous courts that have held in favor of ADA protection for
asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals.17 1 Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the Fourth Circuit has turned its back on a population that
is treated with disgust and contempt for no evident reasons other
than irrational fear and foolish myth. 73
Under the ADA, "The term 'disability' means, with respect to
an individual, (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantial-
ly limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment." '74  Despite the Fourth Circuit's
failure to recognize that an asymptomatic victim of HIV likely
166. See cases cited supra note 16.
167. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942-43 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
168. See generally Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997)
(denying disability status under the ADA to an asymptomatic HIV-positive plaintiff).
169. See id. at 168.
170. Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5.
171. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 166; see also The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12117, 12134(a) (1990) (empowering both the DOJ and the EEOC
to promulgate regulations to implement the ADA).
172. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 156; see also supra notes 59-93 and accompanying text
(discussing the tendency at common law to afford disability status under the ADA to the
asymptomatic HIV-positive individual).
173. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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meets both the first and third prongs of this definition, courts
should hold in future cases that such infected persons qualify as
individuals with disabilities under the ADA. Courts should reject
the Fourth Circuit's reasoning and adopt the First Circuit's
approach to ADA coverage of HIV and AIDS.
A. The Fourth Circuit Failed to Follow the Evidence: Asymp-
tomatic HIV Infection is an Impairment that Substantially
Limits One or More Major Life Activities
The Fourth Circuit's 1997 decision in Runnebaum to deny
disability status under the ADA to an asymptomatic HIV-positive
individual discounts established precedent, l"' ignores medical
evidence,176 mocks congressional intent,
77 and defies logic.17
1. Medical, Legislative, and Administrative Evidence: Asymp-
tomatic HIV Infection is a Physical Impairment-The former
Surgeon General, Dr. C. Everett Koop, concluded that asymptom-
atic HIV-positive individuals are clearly physically impaired from
a scientific perspective. 179  He determined that even though they
appear outwardly healthy, they are in fact seriously ill with a
detectable condition affecting the hemic and lymphatic systems.180
The United States Supreme Court has pronounced that courts
should defer to the advice of medical experts.8 '
Although the Surgeon General's findings were available to
both the First and Fourth Circuits at the time of the Abbott and
Runnebaum decisions,8 2 the Fourth Circuit failed to defer to the
Surgeon General's medical expertise."' The court relied instead
on its own reasoning that, unless one's symptoms are visible to the
175. See supra notes 60-93 and accompanying text.
176. See generally Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the former Surgeon
General's medical findings with regard to HIV and AIDS).
177. See supra notes 25-59 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 215-260, 267-269 and accompanying text.
179. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5.
180. See id.
181. See School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987). Courts
"should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials." Id.
182. The Surgeon General's findings are detailed in the Kmiec Memorandum to which
both the First and Fourth Circuits had access and on which the Fourth Circuit relied in its
Runnebaum opinion. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19 n.6, Abbott v.
Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1643), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998); Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
183. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at.
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court's eye, one can suffer no diminishing effects.18 In addition
to defying precedent, such logic fails to follow the type of medical
advice that society relies on daily in putting trust and faith in
doctors to diagnose and treat ailments. If all courts were to
disregard expert medical knowledge and professional advice in
favor of their own medical opinions, they would no longer
represent a pinnacle of justice, but a mockery of those professions
that the public holds in highest esteem.
In addition to clear medical pronouncements, both legislative
history and administrative regulations clarify that asymptomatic
HIV infection is a physical impairment. 185  In Abbott, the First
Circuit properly deferred to the regulations in finding that Ms.
Abbott suffered from an impairment even though she did not
manifest any outwardly visible symptoms.186 As the Abbott court
noted, a court's role is to "discern the legislature's will.'
187
Furthermore, ADA regulations embody congressional intent in
passing the ADA, 8 and courts should accord significant weight
to them. t19  As the agencies that promulgate regulations have the
final authority to do so, as well as the right to enforce the
ADA, 9 ° their interpretations of the regulations are entitled to
"controlling weight." 91 Despite the deference due agency regula-
tions, the Fourth Circuit found them to be unpersuasive and
dismissed their content.192
"The problem of discrimination against persons with HIV was
a particular focus of the ADA's drafters."'1 93 The Fourth Circuit,
184. See id.
185. See supra notes 25-59 and accompanying text.
186. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 938.
187. Id.
188. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1990).
Congress voiced approval of the regulations' view that asymptomatic HIV-infection is a
disability under the ADA. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990). When Congress
voices such approval, it has essentially imposed the regulations as binding authority upon the
courts. See United States v. Board of Comm'rs., 435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978).
189. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
863 (1984); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 585, 588 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 1995);
Ferguson v. Phoenix, 931 F. Supp. 688, 695 (D. Ariz. 1996); Pinnock v. Int'l House of
Pancakes, 844 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994).
190. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12117, 12134.
191. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
192. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
193. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934
(1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1643).
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however, has failed to adhere to congressional intent.'94 In
Runnebaum, the court determined that it was not constrained to
rely on either legislative history or administrative regulations
because the ADA's language is unambiguous. 95 It found that
ADA language is clear: Congress failed to define the term
"impairment," and the dictionary defines it as a condition having
diminishing effects on an individual.196 The court concluded that
asymptomatic HIV infection is not an impairment because an
individual cannot suffer diminishing effects without outwardly
visible symptoms.'97
The Fourth Circuit's argument that a lack of outwardly visible
symptoms necessarily proves a lack of diminishing effects is
unpersuasive. One's strength and ability to function might be
significantly impaired despite the inability of others to detect such
diminishing effects without the aid of medical instruments. It is
illogical to conclude that a person's body suffers no diminishing
effects when a fatal disease consumes its nervous and immune
systems.
Additionally, the Runnebaum court's view that the ADA's
language is unambiguous and permits a court to defy congressional
purpose is questionable at best. First, in 1995, in Torcasio v.
Murray, 98 the Fourth Circuit itself found that the ADA's defini-
tion of disability is "unilluminating" and that the task of defining
the term "impairment" was left to the agencies promulgating
regulations.199 Furthermore, in both Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Company2. ° and Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,2" t the Supreme Court held that
courts must give deference to legislative history and administrative
regulations when interpreting ambiguous statutory language. 22 As
the Fourth Circuit previously found that ADA language is
ambiguous,20 3 and as Supreme Court precedent requires judicial
194. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 156 (4th Cir. 1997); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. and
Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59 (4th Cir. 1995).
195. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 168.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995).
199. Id. at 1353.
200. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
201. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
202. See Green, 490 U.S. at 508; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
203. See Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1353.
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deference to legislative history and agency regulations when
interpreting ambiguous statutory language,2" the Runnebaum
court defied both prior Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent when it found ADA language clear and interpreted the
ADA's definition of disability without regard to legislative history
or administrative regulations.
Second, the ADA expressly demands that courts not construe
its language to provide less protection than that provided under the
Rehabilitation Act.2 5 Precedent establishes that asymptomatic
HIV is an impairment under the Rehabilitation Act.2 0°6  There-
fore, in refusing to recognize asymptomatic HIV as an impairment,
the Fourth Circuit has afforded less protection under the ADA
than that traditionally afforded under the Rehabilitation Act.
Third, the term "impairment" is extremely broad. Even the
dictionary on which the Runnebaum court relied uses broad
language to define it.2° 7  What constitutes "diminishing effects,"
"deterioration," or a "decrease in strength, value, amount, or
quality?" Answering this question raises two problems. First,
different individuals and courts will define these vague words
differently and thus prevent their uniform application. Second, the
determination necessarily implicates the exercise of policy judg-
ments, and such policy-making is a function of the legislative, not
the judicial, branch.28  The ADA's language is not clear merely
204. See cases cited supra note 202.
205. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1990).
206. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522-24 (11th Cir. 1991); Doe v. Garrett,
903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990); Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 876 F.
Supp. 1437, 1465 (E.D. Pa. 1995); T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D. Utah 1993);
Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992); Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F.
Supp. 632, 635 (D. Mass. 1991).
207. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 168 (4th Cir. 1997). The
dictionary on which the Fourth Circuit relied defines "impair" as, among other things, to
cause "diminishing effects," "deterioration," or a "decrease in strength, value, amount, or
quality." Id.
208. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118
S. Ct. 2196 (1998). The court's "role is not to set public policy, but, rather, to discern the
legislature's will." Id.; see also, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963)
(emphasizing that the "intrusion by the judiciary into the realm of legislative value judg-
ments" is impermissible); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 234 (1956)
(explaining that the judiciary has no concern with policy questions). In Hanson, the court
stated:
Congress, acting within its constitutional powers, has the final say on policy issues.
If it acts unwisely, the electorate can make a change. The task of the judiciary
ends once it appears that the legislative measure adopted is relevant or appropri-
ate to the constitutional power which Congress exercises .... The decision rests
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because it fails to define impairment and because a dictionary
definition of impairment exists. ADA language is broad and
subject to interpretation. Agencies have authority to promulgate
regulations to implement the ADA, and courts should defer to
legislative history and agency regulations when interpreting the
ADA's definition of disability.0 9
Although Congress intended to protect the asymptomatic but
HIV-positive individual,"0 and although administrative regula-
tions designate asymptomatic HIV as an impairment,21' the
Fourth Circuit has assumed the right to overreach its judicial
212 ibounds. In finding congressional intent unpersuasive, and in
defining the statutory term "impairment" without regard to
authorized agency regulations, 213 it has entered the realm of
policy-making. Such conduct threatens the separation of powers on
which the American government is founded.214 If upheld, the
Fourth Circuit's reasoning will pave the way for activist courts to
overstep their judicial functions and to intrude on the realm of the
legislative branch. If courts were to ignore habitually the clear
congressional intent underlying statutory language, then public
confidence in American governance would eventually perish. In
order to preserve faith in the law, to prevent judicial overreaching,
and to enforce statutory language as written, courts must not
intentionally disregard legislative history or administrative regula-
tions.
with the policy makers, not with the judiciary.
Id.
209. See, e.g., Hanson, 351 U.S. at 234; Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P.,
117 F.3d 579, 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108,
1112-14 (8th Cir. 1995); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 781 (1st Cir. 1990);
Ferguson v. Phoenix, 931 F. Supp. 688, 695 (D. Ariz. 1996); United States v. Morvant, 898
F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. La. 1995); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D.N.J. 1995);
Pinnock v. Int'l House of Pancakes, 844 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S.
1228 (1994).
210. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990) (declaring that HIV,
whether symptomatic or not, is an impairment under the ADA). Even ADA opponents
admit that the ADA applies to asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals. See 135 CONG. REC.
§ 10,765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).
211. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630(2)(1) (1995); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1994).
212. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 167.
213. See id. at 168.
214. See generally U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III (setting forth the powers of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government).
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2. Statutory Language, Common Law, and Logical Persua-
sion: Reproduction is a Major Life Activity-Major life activities
are "those basic activities that the average person in the general
population can perform with little or no difficulty," and they
include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." '215 This list, however, is not exclusive,216 and repro-
duction "fits comfortably within its sweep." '217 Additionally, as
the ADA adopts the definition of "major life activities" as found
in the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act,218 and as
case law pursuant to those regulations establishes that reproduction
is indeed a major life activity,219 the ADA contemplates coverage
of impairments that substantially limit reproduction.
The First and Fourth Circuits disagree on whether reproduc-
tion is a major life activity. While both circuits have relied in part
on the dictionary definition of the term "major" as meaning
relatively more important or significant than other life activi-
ties,"' they have reached opposite conclusions in applying that
definition.221 In Runnebaum, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged
that reproduction is one of the most fundamental of human
activities, but found that the ability to reproduce alone does not
render the activity major under the ADA.222 In contrast, in
Abbott, the First Circuit reasoned that "[r]eproduction (and the
215. 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)(I).
216. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630(2)(I); see also EEOC TA Manual, supra note 51,
at 11-3. "These are examples only. Other activities such as sitting, standing, lifting, or reading
are also major life activities." Id.
217. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S.
Ct. 2196 (1998).
218. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1990).
219. See, e.g., Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding
that major life activities include "procreation, sexual contact, and normal social relation-
ships"); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. I11. 1988)
(noting that the AIDS victim "may not engage in reproductive functions without endangering
the lives of others," and that "where such activity is appropriate, the mere prospect of such
a limitation is certain to restrict social interaction with those of the opposite sex"); see also,
e.g., Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1987) ("Per-
sons infected with the AIDS virus suffer significant impairments of their major life activi-
ties .... Even those who are asymptomatic have abnormalities ... making procreation and
childbirth dangerous to themselves and others.")
220. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 170 (4th Cir. 1997); Abbott,
107 F.3d at 940.
221. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 170; Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941.
222. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 170.
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bundle of activities that it encompasses) constitutes a major life
activity because of its singular importance to those who engage in
it, both in terms of its significance in their lives and in terms of its
relation to their day-to-day existence., 223  In the future, courts
should reject the Fourth Circuit's attenuated reasoning in favor of
the First Circuit's logic.
The rights to conceive and to raise children are essential and
basic civil rights protected under the United States Constitu-
tion.22' Both Congress and courts have long recognized the
significance of procreation in an individual's life.2' Given the
traditional constitutional, legislative, and judicial treatment of
reproduction as a fundamental right, a holding that such activity is
not major trivializes the very act without which the human race
would expire. People view reproduction as one of the most
significant moments and greatest achievements in life.226 Many
view the inability to procreate as a huge disappointment. 27 Thus,
[T]o call working a major life activity, but to deny the same
status to reproduction, seems ludicrous .... [Pleople have
been producing offspring for far longer than they have been
working. This holds all the more true for women, who, until
223. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941.
224. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); see also Abbott, 107 F.3d at 939.
Referring to Stanley v. Illinois, the First Circuit stated that "HIV-positive status has a
profound impact upon.., ability to engage in intimate sexual activity, gestation, giving birth,
childrearing, and nurturing familial relations. Our society has long recognized the
fundamental importance of each element of this cluster of activities, and our jurisprudence
reflects this bias." Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25 n.ll,
Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1643). "Reproduction is 'major'
because society, the courts, and the Constitution accept it as one of the most fundamental
activities in human life." Id.
225. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
859 (1992); see also, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 443, 447 (1990) (finding that
procreation is part of liberty and is a basic civil right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (acknowledging the significance of procreation to the individual); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (emphasizing that procreation is a basic civil right that
plays a fundamental role in the survival of the human race). See generally Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (recognizing the right of a woman
to reproduce and to be free from employment discrimination based on her exercise of that
right); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990) (expressing that procreation and intimate
sexual relations are major life activities); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1990) (noting that
reproduction and intimate relations are major life activities). Congress has also recognized
that employment policies must accommodate working parents to provide them with job
security. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(a)(3), 2612(a)(1)(A)-(C) (1994).
226. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. I11. 1996).
227. See id.
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relatively recently, had to choose between working and child-
bearing, and more frequently chose the latter.2"
In light of the individual and constitutional importance
attached to reproduction, the Fourth Circuit's assertion that
procreation is a fundamental human activity, but not a major one
under the ADA,"9 is disingenuous. The Fourth Circuit essential-
ly stated that reproduction is less significant than other life activi-
ties."' It is fallacious, however, to argue that the very foundation
of human existence, one dependant on the ability to reproduce and
aimed at the continued evolution of humankind, is not major.
Reproduction is at least as significant as, if not more significant
than, such ADA-protected activities as working, walking, speaking,
and hearing, for without reproduction, no one would exist to
perform those other functions. The First Circuit's recognition that
"[t]he plain meaning of the word 'major' denotes comparative
importance," and that "reproduction, which is both the source of
all life and one of life's most important activities, easily qualifies
under that criterion," '231 is consistent with this concept. By
relegating procreation to an inferior status under the ADA, the
Fourth Circuit has denied value to the most essential component of
human life, a fundamental human activity protected by the Federal
Constitution and cherished by the American populace.
Equally objectionable is the Eighth Circuit's argument, cited
by the Runnebaum court,232 that reproduction is not a major life
activity because individuals fail to procreate as frequently as they
walk, see, speak, breathe, learn, or engage in other activities."'
228. Id.
229. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 170 & 173 n.9 (4th Cir. 1997).
230. See id. at 170. The court stated that an activity is a major life activity under the
ADA "if it is relatively more significant or important than other life activities." Id. In
finding that reproduction is not major, the court implied that it is no more significant than
any other human activity.
231. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-40 (lst Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118
S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
232. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 170.
233. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996). Denying
an infertile plaintiff disability status under the ADA, the court found that reproduction is not
a major life activity because individuals do not procreate as frequently as they engage in
other activities. See id:; see also Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243
(E.D. La. 1995). Denying disability status to a former television anchor who brought an
ADA claim against her former employer, the court found that reproduction is not a major
life activity because people do not procreate all-day-every-day or thus as often as they walk,
seek, speak, breath, or learn. See id.
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Perhaps that argument would be persuasive were reproduction
limited to the mere act of sexual intercourse leading to conception.
Procreation, however, implicates continual biological processes in
both males and females.234 It may consume even more time than
activities like walking, speaking, working, or learning. "Limitation
of reproduction to conception also ignores the process of raising
and caring for offspring upon which successful reproduction
depends.''235  Even if frequency were the basis for designating
major life activities under the ADA, properly viewing reproduction
as a continual and complex biological, and possibly social, process
would satisfy that requirement. 36
Moreover, there is no reason why an activity must be frequent
to be major. There is no evidence in the ADA, the administrative
regulations, or the legislative history that major life activities are
only those in which individuals engage with frequency.237 Even
those activities enumerated in the regulations and mentioned in
legislative history fail to share an element of regularity, for
learning, in the sense of attending school, is not a part of everyday
life and many people do not work.238 Perhaps most significantly,
to define a major life activity in terms of quantity rather than
quality is to trivialize the very significance of activities that the
word "major" seeks to include within the ADA framework.239
As a practical matter, courts should view reproduction as a
major life activity for at least three reasons. First, Congress used
the term "life," which is inherently broad and necessarily covers
procreation as the basis of all life. 4° Second, administrative
regulations list the reproductive system among those that may be
234. See Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges, 911 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D.
Ill. 1995).
235. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D. Me. 1995), affid, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.
1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
236. See Deborah K. Dallmann, The Lay View of what "Disability" Means must Give Way
to what Congress Says it Means: Infertility as a "Disability" under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 403 (1996).
237. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 941 (1st Cir. 1997).
238. See id.; see also Sandra M. Tomkowicz, The Disabling Effects of Infertility: Fertile
Grounds for Accommodating Infertile Couples Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051, 1068 (1996). Even if all of the activities listed in the EEOC
regulations were performed every-day-all-day and each as frequently as the next, "the EEOC
has not defined major life activities in terms of the frequency or regularity with which these
activities are performed." Id.
239. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. I11. 1996).
240. See Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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impaired for ADA purposes, implying that reproduction is a major
life activity."' Third, the ADA's language does not preclude
reproduction as a major life activity.242
3. Legislative History, Agency Regulations, and Rational
Interpretation: Asymptomatic HIV Substantially Limits Its Victim's
Ability to Reproduce-Congress enacted the ADA with the view
that HIV infection, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic,
substantially limits its victims' ability to reproduce.243 Agencies
promulgating regulations under the ADA agree that asymptomatic
HIV substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction.2"
"Substantially limits" is defined as the inability to perform, or
significantly restricted in the condition, manner, or duration of
performance of, a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform.245 In determining whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, courts should
consider, without regard to medications or other mitigating
measures, the impairment's "nature and severity; how long it will
last or is expected to last; [and] its permanent or long term impact,
or expected impact.' 246  Since HIV is a. permanent and fatal
disease that one has a substantial risk of transmitting to one's
offspring through procreation, 247  it significantly restricts the
condition, manner, and duration under which an infected individual
can reproduce as compared to the average person in the general
population who can procreate without facing such deadly obstacles.
The Fourth Circuit has concluded that nothing inherent in
asymptomatic HIV prevents reproduction, and that there is no
"causal nexus" between the physical effects of HIV and reproduc-
tion.248 It has reasoned that what limits an infected individual's
procreation is merely that individual's reaction to his or her HIV-
241. See Pacourek, 916 F. Supp. at 802.
242. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1990).
243. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990).
244. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630(2)(I) (1995); EEOC TA Manual, supra note 51,
at 11-4.
245. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)0).
246. EEOC TA Manual, supra note 51, at 11-4.
247. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded,; 118
S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
see also Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5-7 (explaining that asymptomatic HIV
infection permanently debilitates, eventually kills, and may be transmitted to a baby during
pregnancy).
248. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir. 1997).
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positive status.2 4 9  The ADA, however, requires neither one's
complete inability to engage in a particular life activity nor a causal
nexus. In addition, it fails to explain how an impairment must limit
an activity.25 ° The ADA requires only a substantial limitation,
and it does not distinguish between physical and behavioral limita-
tions."'
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's claim that HIV does not
limit reproduction in a physical sense is illogical. HIV infection
physically affects and substantially limits sexual relations and
procreation because of the substantial risk of transmission.252
Based on the medical knowledge available ... it is reasonable
to conclude that the life activity of procreation-the fulfillment
of the desire to conceive and bear healthy children-is substan-
tially limited for an asymptomatic HIV-infected individual. In
light of the significant risk that the AIDS virus may be trans-
mitted to a baby during pregnancy, HIV-infected individuals
cannot, whether they are male or female, engage in the act of
procreation with the normal expectation of bringing forth a
healthy child. Because of the infection in their system, they will
be unable to fulfill this basic human desire. There is little
doubt that procreation is a major life activity and that the
physical ability to engage in normal procreation-procreation
free from the fear of what the infection will do to one's
child-is substantially limited once an individual is infected with
the AIDS virus. 53
The First Circuit's logic in Abbott is persuasive: "No reasonable
juror could conclude that an 8% risk of passing an incurable,
debilitating, and inevitably fatal disease to one's child is not a
substantial restriction on reproductive activity.
', 254
249. See id.
250. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st
Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
251. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1990);
see also Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 184 (Michael, J., dissenting) ("There is no requirement that
the impairment physically limit the life activity, nor is there any specification about how the
impairment must substantially limit that activity.")
252. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 185 (Michael, J., dissenting); see also Kmiec Memoran-
dum, supra note 2, at 5 n.9 ("Infection with the [AIDS] virus affects the reproductive system
because of the significant danger that the virus will be transmitted to a baby during
pregnancy.")
253. Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 6-7 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).




The Fourth Circuit's argument that asymptomatic HIV
infection does not substantially limit reproduction because
reproduction is a mere lifestyle choice is unconvincing. 5 The
First Circuit referred to it as an "emaciated argument" that lacked
force and as a mere "exercise in semantics." '256 There are at least
two reasons why the First Circuit's logic is more practical and thus
more persuasive than the Fourth Circuit's reasoning.
First, most acts that individuals perform or fail to perform
result from an exercise of volition.257 For example, speaking,
which is undisputedly a major life activity, depends on one's
making the decision to speak, for there are those, such as monks,
who choose to avoid it.2 8 Also, persons might choose not to
work for reasons other than a disability, yet work is undeniably
recognized as a major life activity.259 The fact that one may
choose whether to exercise one's constitutionally protected option
to forego reproduction does not deny reproduction the status of a
major life activity, for the very protection of one's right to exercise
that choice illuminates the value society places on procreation.26
Second, viewing reproduction as a mere lifestyle choice
necessarily requires a determination of whether a particular
plaintiff actually chose not to procreate because of his or her HIV-
positive status. Although the ADA asks whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity of a given individual,261
and while individualized inquiry is generally proper,262 the nature
of HIV infection forces a conclusion that the virus will always
substantially limit its victims' reproductive capacities. 263  Courts
interpreting either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act have not
questioned whether a given plaintiff intended to procreate before
learning of his or her HIV infection; rather, they have held that
255. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 172.
256. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See Tomkowicz, supra note 238, at 1076.
260. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 24-25, Abbott v. Bragdon, 107
F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1643), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
261. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1990).
262. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d at 166 (4th Cir. 1997); Abbott, 107
F.3d at 941.
263. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1990);
29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630(2)(1) (1995); see also Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 185 (Michael,
J., dissenting) (arguing that common sense compels the conclusion that HIV substantially
limits reproduction due to the significant risk of transmission).
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HIV itself, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, inherently and
substantially limits reproduction because of its physical effects on
the body.2"4
Case-by-case analysis of whether an individual's impairment
substantially limits a major life activity does not require inquiry
into whether the activity is of particular importance to the
individual, but only into whether the individual is able to perform
the activity.265 The substantial limits that asymptomatic HIV
places on one's ability to reproduce because of the significant risk
of transmission is well established.2" To adopt a rule permitting
an individualized inquiry into when and why one decides to
procreate is to render a single law susceptible to innumerable
interpretations, evading consistency and possibly excluding
deserving individuals from ADA coverage.
Furthermore, if whether reproduction is limited depends on
one's intent to reproduce, then the fate of those unable to show
their reproductive plans will be uncertain."' Both those who
choose to procreate despite HIV infection and homosexuals who
may be unable to explain how HIV infection has altered their
reproductive plans may be subject to undue discrimination without
any recourse.268 ADA protection for HIV-positive individuals
will be haphazard and dependant on such circumstances as fertility
and reproductive intentions, which are unrelated to the discrimina-
tion at issue.26 9 ADA decisions should not rely on whether an
individual intends to have children. Medical evidence suggests that,
due to the high risk of transmission, the asymptomatic HIV-positive
individual's ability to reproduce is substantially limited in condition,
manner, and duration as compared to the average person in the
general population.27 °
264. See, e.g., Abbott, 107 F.3d at 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d
1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522-24 (11th Cir. 1991); Doe
v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990); Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d
701 (9th Cit. 1988); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992).
265. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 166; Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941.
266. See supra notes 243-54 and accompanying text.
267. See Jackson & Parmet, supra note 4, at 35.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 35-36.
270. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5-8.
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B. The Fourth Circuit's Failure to Recognize Public Perception:
An Asymptomatic HIV-Positive Person is Regarded as
Having an Impairment that Substantially Limits One or More
of the Major Life Activities
Judicial focus appears to be on the first prong of the ADA's
definition of "disability,"27 t "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.
272
An asymptomatic HIV-positive individual, however, may satisfy the
third prong of the definition, an individual "regarded as having
such an impairment. ', 273  In School Board of Nassau County,
Florida v. Arline,274 the Supreme Court recognized that "society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment. '275  Despite medical evidence to the contrary, over
one-third of Americans believe that AIDS is more contagious than
a common cold.276 Consequently, diagnosis with the AIDS virus
generates unfounded fear and prejudice against HIV victims that
"typically signifies a social death as concrete as the physical one
which follows.
2 77
The HIV-positive individual is often shunned and excluded
from public life.27' The attitudes of others toward the impairment
substantially limit that person's ability to function in society, and
may even go so far as to deter that person from seeking medical
treatment in an effort to avoid public humiliation.279 People face




For example, one may be unable to find employment because
of some facial disfigurement, 211 a limitation Congress intended to
271. See supra notes 60-93 and accompanying text.
272. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1990).
273. Id. § 12102(2)(C).
274. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
275. Id. at 284.
276. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679-80 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
277. Id. at 679.
278. See generally Jackson & Parmet, supra note 4, at 10 (discussing public reaction to
the spread of HIV and AIDS).
279. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27, Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d
934 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1643), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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protect under the ADA.282 As the public might prevent one with
a facial disfigurement from working despite that person's ability to
do so, the public might also prevent the asymptomatic HIV-positive
individual from participating fully in society because of the
unfounded fear-based refusal to associate with him or her.283
There are in effect socially-created limitations on major life
activities. 2 4 Discrimination based on an unsubstantiated fear of
contagion is in conflict with the basic purpose of the ADA, which
is to protect individuals with disabilities from employment or other
discrimination based on prejudice or ignorance.285 Nevertheless,
such discrimination continues and consistently denies HIV victims
the full benefits of membership in a civilized community.286  As
one court has noted:
The particular associations AIDS shares with sexual fault, drug
use, social disorder, and with racial minorities, the poor, and
other historically disenfranchised groups accentuates the
tendency to visit condemnation upon its victims .... [T]o
conclude that persons with AIDS are stigmatized is an under-
statement; they are widely stereotyped as indelibly miasmic,
untouchable, physically and morally polluted. These and
related prejudices substantially curtail the major life activities of
AIDS victims.
28
The public's misperception of HIV, as well as its exaggerated fear
Of contagion, may serve to render the asymptomatic HIV-positive
person an individual with a disability under the ADA.288
V. The Supreme Court Declares ADA Coverage for the
Asymptornatic HIV-Positive Victim
On June 25, 1998, in Bragdon v. Abbott,289 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit's holding that Ms.
Abbott, an asymptomatic HIV-positive individual, is entitled to
282. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990).
283. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679-80 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
284. See Jackson & Parmet, supra note 4, at 43.
285. See School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
286. See Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 680.
287. Id.
288. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 8.
289. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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ADA protection. 90 When Dr. Bragdon refused to perform the
routine procedure of filling her cavity outside of a hospital setting,
Ms. Abbott brought action against him under Section 302 of the
ADA, which prohibits discrimination "on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who ... operates a place of public
accommodation. ' '29 1 Public accommodations include the profes-
sional office of a health care provider.292 In its holding, the
Supreme Court relied on the first prong of the definition of
disability-a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual-and did
not consider the potential applicability of the other prongs.
293
Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion, summarized the
Court's views: HIV infection is a disease limiting life itself,
inevitably pervading life's choices, including education, employ-
ment, family, and financial undertakings, and affecting the need for
and the availability of health care because of the reaction of others
to it; it is irrational to forbid discrimination once symptoms become
visible, but not beforehand although the disease is still present.294
The Court first noted that the term "disability" in the ADA
has the same definition as the term "handicap" in both the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973295 and the Fair Housing Amendments
of 1988.296 The Court explained that, as Congress had repeated
the definition in the ADA, Congress obviously intended it to be
construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations
of the Rehabilitation Act and Fair Housing Amendments, especial-
ly as it expressly stated that the ADA would provide at least as
much protection as the Rehabilitation Act.297 Thus, interpreta-
tions of and case law under the Rehabilitation Act apply equally to
the ADA.
290. See id. at 2201. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, announced that asymptom-
atic HIV infection easily falls within the ADA's definition of disability. See id. at 2213
(Stevens, J., concurring).
291. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1990).
292. See id. § 12181(7)(F).
293. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
294. See id. at 2213-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
295. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1973).
296. 42 U.S.C. §3602(h)(1) (1988).
297. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202.
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The Court next recognized that asymptomatic HIV is a
physical impairment.298 Regulations implementing the Rehabilita-
tion Act have intentionally failed to include a list of disorders
constituting physical or mental impairments out of concern that any
enumeration would not be comprehensive. 99 Additionally, HIV
is not included in the representative list relegated to the regula-
tions' commentary because it was not identified as the cause of
AIDS until 1983, but the Court found that it "does fall well within
the general definition set forth by the regulations.,
300
Relying on medical evidence, the Court acknowledged that
HIV follows a predictable and unalterable course, invading
different blood and body tissue cells and using an enzyme to mimic
the genetic material of a target cell and to replicate itself in order
to attack other cells.30' Antibodies are ineffective to eliminate
the virus, which eventually kills its victim's cells and deteriorates its
victim's ability to combat infections from various sources.30 2
Symptoms associated with initial infection include fever, headaches,
enlargement of the lymph nodes, muscle pain, rashes, lethargy,
gastrointestinal distress, and neurological disorders.30 3 After such
symptoms dissipate, one enters the asymptomatic phase, which
usually lasts between seven and eleven years, during which time the
virus migrates from its victim's circulatory system to the lymph
nodes. °" During this phase, one usually suffers from forms of
pneumonia and cancer, fever, weight loss, fatigue, lesions, nausea,
and diarrhea. 305 The court noted:
In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to damage
the infected person's white blood cells and the severity of the
disease .... it is an impairment from the moment of infec-
tion ... HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory
definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the
disease.3°6
298. See id. at 2204.
299. See id. at 2202.
300. Id. at 2203.
301. See id.
302. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2203.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 2204.
305. See id.
306. Id. (recognizing that HIV infection causes immediate abnormalities in the blood with
a constant and detrimental effect on the hemic and lymphatic systems).
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The Supreme Court also held that reproduction, or child
bearing, is a major life activity under the ADA.37 Justice Kenne-
dy stated: "We have little difficulty concluding that it is." 30 8 As
noted by the court of appeals, "[t]he plain meaning of the word
'major' denotes comparative importance," and "[rieproduction and
the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process
itself."30 9 Dr. Bragdon's argument that if activity is not of public,
economic, or daily character, it is so unimportant or insignificant as
not to be major misconceives the breadth of the term "major.
310
Furthermore, "the Rehabilitation Act regulations support the
inclusion of reproduction as a major life activity, since reproduction
could not be regarded as any less important than working and
learning."3"'
The dissenters, however, pointed out that an additional
definition of "major," as greater in quantity, number, or extent, is
most consistent with the ADA's illustrative list of major life
activities, including caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.312 They argued that reproduction is important, but that
so are numerous other decisions, such as who to marry, where to
live, and what job to have.313 The common thread among the
listed activities is not fundamental importance, but repetition and
importance to daily existence-"quite different from the series of
activities leading to the birth of a child." '314 Similarly, Justice
O'Connor espoused the view that
[T]he act of giving birth to a child, while a very important part
of the lives of many women, is not generally the same as the
representative major life activities of all persons-"caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working"-isted in regula-
tions relevant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.315
307. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
308. Id.
309. Id. (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (lst Cir. 1997)).
310. See id.
311. Id.




315. Id. at 2217 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The dissenters' arguments fail to recognize that an activity may
be "major" although it is performed less frequently than others.
They fail to account for the fact that bearing children may be more
significant to an individual's daily existence than are activities such
as speaking or working. For example, many give up their jobs in
order to raise children, such that child rearing becomes a greater
part of daily life than does working. The dissenters argue that
activities such as walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, and learning
are greater in quantity, number, and extent than reproduction.
Individuals who are unable to walk, see, hear, or speak, however,
may be able to reproduce, such that reproduction is a greater part
of their lives than are the former activities. Furthermore, some
people reproduce numerous times throughout their lives, and spend
the majority of their time raising their offspring. In those cases,
reproduction and child rearing may be what consumes the majority
of one's thought and activity. The fact that so many undergo
fertility treatments in attempts to get pregnant suggests the pivotal
role that reproduction plays in human life. The dissenters should
acknowledge the vital role of reproduction in human life, including
the amount of time and effort that is involved in childbirth and
child rearing.
The Supreme Court also held that asymptomatic HIV does
substantially limit reproduction.316 First, an HIV-positive woman
who tries to conceive a child imposes on her male partner a
significant risk of becoming infected, for 20% of male partners of
HIV-positive women become HIV-positive themselves. 317  Sec-
ond, an HIV-positive woman risks infecting her child during
gestation and childbirth; there is a 25% risk of transmitting the
virus to the child.318  Even though antiretroviral therapy can
reduce the risk of perinatal transmission to about 8%, "[ilt cannot
be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting a dread
and fatal disease to one's child does not represent a substantial
limitation on reproduction." '319
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist postulated that whether
Ms. Abbott has a disability under the ADA is an individualized
316. See id. at 2206.





inquiry.32° He argued that Ms. Abbot's major life activities, prior
to her infection, did not include reproduction because "[t]here is
absolutely no evidence that, absent the HIV, respondent would
have had or was even considering having children., 32' Similarly
to the Fourth Circuit, Justice Rehnquist focused on the voluntary
nature of procreation, noting that those infected with HIV are
entirely able to have intercourse, to give birth, and to rear a child
to maturity.322 He argued that one may choose not to reproduce,
but that voluntary choice does not constitute a limit on one's own
life activities and HIV does not even render its victim less able
than others to reproduce.323 The ADA, Justice Rehnquist be-
lieves, focuses on present limitations; Ms. Abbott's potential
inability to raise the child to adulthood is irrelevant and the
possible future effect of her HIV is insufficient to render her
"disabled," for otherwise her argument "would render every
individual with a genetic marker for some debilitating disease
'disabled."
324
Nevertheless, a majority of the Court recognized that the ADA
addresses substantial limitations on life activities, not utter
inabilities. 325 While conception and childbirth are not impossible
for an HIV victim, they are dangerous to the public health, and so
constitute a substantial limitation.326 The decision to reproduce
carries economic and legal consequences as well. Antiretroviral
therapy, supplemental insurance, and long-term health care are
expensive costs that are necessary to examine and treat infected
children. 327  Some states even forbid HIV-positive individuals to
have sexual relations with others, regardless of consent. 328  "In
the end, the disability definition does not turn on personal choice.
When significant limitations result from the impairment, the
definition is met even if the difficulties are not insurmount-
able. '329
320. See id. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
321. Id. at 2215.
322. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2216.
323. See id.
324. Id.
325. See id. at 2206.
326. See id.
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In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's position in Runnebaum, the
Supreme Court held further that courts must seek guidance from
the agencies implementing legislation, for the regulations represent
well-reasoned views as well as a body of experience and informed
judgment.33 The Court noted that all agencies that have ad-
dressed the definition of "disability" or "handicap" under the
Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, or the ADA have come
to the same conclusion-asymptomatic HIV is a disability or handi-
cap.33' Justice Kennedy stated:
We find the uniformity of the administrative and judicial
precedent construing the definition significant. When adminis-
trative and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of
an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language
in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to
incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as
well .... The uniform body of administrative and judicial
precedent confirms the conclusion we reach today as the most
faithful way to effect the congressional design.332
The DOJ has even gone so far as to add asymptomatic HIV
infection to the list of disorders constituting a physical impairment
under the ADA, and DOJ regulations are entitled to deference.333
The EEOC, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Transpor-
tation all also agree that an asymptomatic HIV-positive individual
is an individual with a disability under the ADA.3 " Although the
Court held that asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the ADA,
the Court remanded to the First Circuit to determine whether Dr.
Bragdon had presented sufficient objective evidence or a triable
issue of fact on the question of risk, namely whether Ms. Abbot's
HIV infection presented a substantial enough risk to his health that
his refusal to fill her cavity in his office was justified.335
VI. Conclusion
Despite the recent debate in the federal circuits, the ADA,
legislative history, administrative regulations, and judicial precedent
all indicate that asymptomatic HIV infection constitutes a disability
330. See id. at 2207.
331. See id. at 2207-08.
332. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2208.
333. See id. at 2209.
334. See id.
335. See id. at 2210-13.
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under the ADA. If Congress had intended to exclude it from
protection, it would have listed it among the others it specifically
exempted from ADA coverage.336 Congress, however, intended
to protect the asymptomatic HIV-positive individual.337
As the Supreme Court recently held, asymptomatic HIV
satisfies the first prong of the ADA's definition of disability
because it is a physical impairment that substantially limits the
major life activity of reproduction. It is an impairment because of
its physical effects on various bodily systems.338 Reproduction is
a major life activity because of the traditional value attributed to
it by the Constitution, the courts, and the public at large.
339
Asymptomatic HIV substantially limits reproduction because of the
significant risk of transmission to offspring of an incurable,
debilitating, and deadly disease.34" The asymptomatic but HIV-
positive individual may also qualify for ADA protection because of
the substantially limiting effects on his or her life activities of
society's fear-based exclusion of him or her from community
life.
341
The Fourth Circuit's failure to recognize asymptomatic HIV as
an ADA-protected disability set a dangerous precedent. In light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, courts now
must reject the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in favor of the First
Circuit's protection of asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals.
336. See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1990).
337. See id. § 12201(a); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-116,
at 22 (1990); 135 CONG. REC. § 10,765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms);
29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)(h)-(j), § 1630, app. § 1630(2)(I) (1995); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1994); EEOC
TA Manual, supra note 51, at 11-4.
338. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1997) vacated and remanded,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990); Austin v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1465 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
339. See, e.g., Abbott, 107 F.3d at 940; Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804
(N.D. Ill. 1996); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colleges, 911 F. Supp. 316, 323 (N.D.
Ill. 1995); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
340. See, e.g., Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942; Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir.
1994); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992); Cain v. Hyatt, 734
F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
341. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522-24 (11th Cir. 1991); Cain, 734 F.
Supp. at 680; see also Jackson & Parmet, supra note 4, at 13, 42-43 (discussing social
reactions to HIV and AIDS); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27-28, Abbott
v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1643) (arguing that the unfounded
perception of HIV contagion constitutes regarding infected individuals as having a disability);
Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 8 (explaining that one is an individual with a disability
if others perceive one as having an impairment that substantially limits one or more of one's
major life activities).
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Discrimination against HIV victims is widespread and has serious
repercussions both for those already infected and for the nation's
efforts to control the AIDS virus.342
Although courts tend to focus on the major life activity of
reproduction, HIV infection substantially limits numerous other life
activities. HIV-positive individuals are counseled not to have
unprotected sex and not to have children, are instructed to be
cautious when traveling because of the risk of illness, may face
significant difficulty obtaining life insurance, may have trouble
securing employment that requires extensive training because of
their short life expectancies, and must take medications that often
demand numerous doctors' appointments.343 While perhaps not
all of the aforementioned activities are "major" for ADA purposes,
intimate sexual relations should be considered a major life
activity.344  "Procreation is perhaps the most important life
activity, since we would cease to exist as a species if we no longer
reproduced .... And intimate sexual relations, while less important
in nature's scheme, have consumed enough of humanity's energy
and interest to count among such activities. 3 45 An HIV-infected
individual is substantially limited in the ability to have intimate
relations in a similar way to the limitation on reproductive capacity.
The substantial risk of transmission renders the HIV victim unable
to engage in unprotected sex or to have relations free from the fear
of infecting his or her partner.
HIV-positive individuals may be substantially limited in the
performance of other major life activities as well. For example,
HIV victims, whether symptomatic or not, may be substantially
limited in their ability to care for themselves due to reliance on
medications and frequent visits to doctors.3 46 Asymptomatic HIV
may substantially limit major life activities because of the effects
that knowledge of the virus has on the individual, specifically
limiting the ability to pursue certain courses of action.3 47  For
instance, the prospect of a premature death is likely to substantially
342. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d
934 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1643), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
343. See id. at 20-21.
344. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 7.
345. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 184 (4th Cir. 1997) (Michael, J.,
dissenting).
346. See Jackson & Parmet, supra note 4, at 42.
347. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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limit functioning in a number of ways. Although Congress and the
courts have focused on reproduction as the major life activity
associated with HIV, there are other alternatives that courts might
consider when deciding ADA cases.
The Fourth Circuit's narrow interpretation of what constitutes
an impairment or major life activity under the ADA ignores
congressional intent to protect individuals with disabilities against
undue discrimination. The Fourth Circuit's interpretation makes it
extremely difficult for persons to achieve protected status, notwith-
standing recent medical information, if they do not fit traditional
molds and understandings of disabilities. "Despite the need to
retain flexibility under the ADA, . . . the outcome of a plaintiff's
claim under that Act depends on a court's willingness to recognize
that the ADA's broad language encompasses nontraditional
disabilities.""34 The Runnebaum Court's discussion of symptoms
as though they have to be outwardly visible in order to exist
demeans all those who battle concealed physical or psychological
symptoms that are, in reality, debilitating and substantially limiting
of major life activities. The Fourth Circuit has told asymptomatic
HIV-positive individuals that they do not have a covered disability,
and has left them unprotected in communities where they are
shunned and humiliated for no reason other than their suffering
from an incurable disease. It is illogical to deny ADA protection
to those whose most basic bodily functions are consumed by a
deadly virus. Such individuals suffer from incurable interior
deterioration, a lifetime reliance on medication, a substantially
limited ability to engage in intimate sexual relations or procreation,
and subjection to a public that deems them handicapped and
disgusting.
In order to preserve humanity and to protect asymptomatic
victims of HIV, courts must adhere to the Supreme Court's
decision that asymptomatic HIV is a protected disability under the
ADA. In light of both settled authority and the public danger of
adopting the Fourth Circuit's approach, courts must follow the
Supreme Court's command that the ADA protects asymptomatic
HIV-positive victims.
Emily J. Carton
348. Dallmann, supra note 236, at 398.
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